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I. INT RODUCT ION
Citizenship should mean something. In a republic, citizenship
should signal far more than protection from deportation. Though some
may lack the franchise, all citizens nevertheless constitute the constituent
members of the political community, whose interests and welfare the
government has been instituted to protect and advance. A caste system is
irreconcilable with the most fundamental precepts of a republic, as the
Declaration of Independence’s assertion that “all men are created equal”
reflects.
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment well knew this. Black
citizenship had been a flashpoint in antebellum debates about both slavery
and the status of free Black people, culminating in perhaps the single-most
shameful moment in the Supreme Court’s long history: the odious claim
in Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion that even freed slaves and
their descendants could not become citizens but rather were, in the eyes
of the law, “so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect.” 1 One of the core purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 2 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 3 before it, was to excise
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1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
2. See, e.g., KURT T. LASH, T HE F OURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE P RIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN C ITIZENSHIP 140 (2014).
3. Id. at 169 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had sought to supplant Dred Scott’s
citizenship holding). See also Michael D. Ramsey, Originalism and Birthright Citizenship, 109 GEO.
L.J. 405, 417 (2020) (“ It is common ground, and has been since their enactment, that the [1866] Act
and the [Fourteenth] Amendment made citizens of the freed slaves and overruled Dred Scott as
applied to persons of African ancestry generally.”).
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from our constitutional order Taney’s corrosive ideology of caste and
replace it with an unambiguous and irreversible commitment to full and
equal citizenship for all persons born or naturalized in the United States,
regardless of race, color, or previous enslavement.
As the Amendment and the statute both evidence, those who steered
the course of the Thirty-ninth Congress knew that a caste system could
not be eradicated and replaced with legal equality by mere legislative
declaration. Congress would need to make the promise of equal
citizenship a reality by eradicating the vestiges of centuries of the most
onerous oppression and responding to the inevitable hostility the intended
transformation would regrettably provoke. That is why the statute
proceeded to enumerate civil rights for federal protection 4 and why the
Fourteenth Amendment ended with an express commitment to Congress
of a broad enforcement authority. 5
Notwithstanding the centrality of Black citizenship to the
Reconstruction project, the concept has played no substantial role in the
jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment. That lamentable omission
can be traced to the Court’s 1883 invalidation of the most sweeping and
progressive civil rights legislation enacted prior to 1964. In the ironically
branded Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 attempting to secure to all persons “full and equal”
access to “inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement” exceeded the powers of Congress. 6 In so
holding, the Court deigned even to acknowledge, let alone explain, its
rejection of the defense that the law was an appropriate means to the end
of obtaining full and equal citizenship for Black people.
That defense of the law had been made both in the legislative debate
preceding the statute’s enactment7 and in the spirited and extended dissent
by Justice Harlan. 8 By ignoring the claim, the majority presaged, indeed
foreordained, the High Court’s enduring disregard of the citizenship
clause as a source of congressional authority to combat pervasive societal
discrimination, a neglect that continues to this day. Recent events, and the
massive protests they spurred, demonstrate that, sadly, the issue of full
and equal citizenship for African Americans has not been mooted by the
4.
5.
6.
7.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-14 (1883).
See ERIC F ONER, T HE S ECOND F OUNDING: HOW THE C IVIL W AR AND R ECONSTRUCTION
R EMADE THE C ONSTITUTION (2019). See generally ALLEN F RIEDLANDER & R ICHARD A. GERBER,
W ELCOMING R UIN: T HE C IVIL R IGHTS ACT OF 1875 (2019) (detailing the long road leading to the
enactment of the 1875 Act).
8. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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intervening 138 years. To the contrary, as the fact of this symposium itself
suggests, the matter has never been more relevant or timely.
This brief essay ventures the claim that one small but significant step
in the direction of restoring our constitutional commitment to Black
citizenship, rightly understood, would be recognition by both the academy
and the judiciary that the Civil Rights Cases belong in the constitutional
anti-canon: that small handful of Supreme Court decisions deemed not
only to have been erroneous but to have been so misguided in rationale
and so disastrous in consequences as to serve as an illustrative example of
what the Court ought never do again.
First comes an abbreviated sketch of the 1875 Act and the 1883
ruling invalidating it, focusing on the Black citizenship issues implicated
by both. Part II of this essay then reviews the contemporaneous reaction
to the 1883 decision, revealing that, although the case today escapes the
derision it deserves, it was in its time perceived by many as the terrible
miscarriage of both law and justice that it is. Part II also explores the
historiography of the Civil Rights Cases and briefly discusses a few of the
many consequences a more appropriate understanding of the decision
would have for the history of Reconstruction and the long civil rights
movement that preceded and followed that pivotal period. Part III will
show that the Civil Rights Cases are not currently accorded anti-canonical
status. It will also identify just a few of the most deleterious
consequences—practical, political, and doctrinal—of the Civil Rights
Cases that compel the ruling’s anti-canonization. Doing so is a crucial
part of a broader effort to restore the true meaning of full and equal
citizenship for all Americans.
II.
Justice Bradley’s opinion for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases
reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment could not supply the power
needed for Congress to enact the accommodations provisions of the 1875
Act because the Amendment forbade only action by state governments
and the challenged provisions sought to regulate “private” entities, such
as railroad corporations, steamboat firms, inns and theaters. 9 There were
many problems with this reasoning, but for present purposes the key
rejoinder was Justice Harlan’s invocation of the Amendment’s citizenship
guarantee. The sole dissenter in the case, Harlan instructed the majority
that Section 5 of the Amendment empowered Congress to enforce all the

9.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-14.
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Amendment’s provisions. 10 To be sure, the second sentence of section 1
spoke of forbidden acts by states, but the first sentence was not so
limited. 11
The Amendment opens, of course, with the unqualified declaration
that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.” 12 Virtually self-evident in today’s political
culture, 13 birthright citizenship was a dramatic reversal of antebellum
constitutional law and a broad promise of full integration of the former
slaves into public life on terms of fundamental legal equality. Access to
public conveyances and inns was indispensable to the exercise of the right
of locomotion, deemed a core element of Anglo-American liberty by no
less an authority than William Blackstone. As the Act’s congressional
proponents and chief judicial defender explained, persons routinely and
pervasively denied that access, and that liberty, were denied the full and
equal citizenship promised by the Amendment. 14
In the light cast by these observations, it seems ineluctable that
Congress’s power to enforce the Amendment embraced the power to
secure such access. Indeed, the Civil Rights Cases majority did not so
much refute this syllogism as ignore it. Not one word can be found in
Justice Bradley’s opinion about the significance of the citizenship grant.
And of course, that omission not only contributed to the demise of the
1875 Act, a calamity itself of incalculable scope. The Court’s tacit
dismissal of an understanding of the citizenship guarantee that accorded
it remedial significance for those long subject to legally imposed
subordination also worked a tragic distortion in our fundamental law that
has curtailed congressional power to redress such subordination to this
day. 15 This corruption of constitutional law is too little remarked upon
today, 16 but many living on the day the ruling was announced promptly
perceived its pernicious potential.

10. Id. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Id.
12. U.S. C ONST. amend XIV, § 1.
13. For an overview of recent controversy concerning the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s citizenship clause to children born to parents not lawfully present in the United States,
see Ramsey, supra note 3, at 421-24.
14. See generally F ONER, supra note 7; F RIEDLANDER & GERBER, supra note 7.
15. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
16. Two rare exceptions are Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. R EV.
1801, 1833-37 (2010), and Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE
L.J. 330, 365-66 (2006). See also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights
and John Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. R EV. 717, 720, 730, 733 (2003) (discussing
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III.
A
The wire service story from Washington that reported the Supreme
Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases noted that “no other decision of
the court since the famous Dred Scott decision by Chief Justice Taney has
created so much excitement and discussion.” 17 In response to Taney’s
opinion in Dred Scott, Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, and others
not only condemned the decision but Lincoln warned of a sequel, a second
Dred Scott ruling where the Taney Court would determine that a state
could not impair a constitutionally protected right to own other human
beings and thereby slavery would be nationalized by becoming legal in all
states. The Civil War and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
eliminated the opportunity for the Court to render such a decision, but in
1883, the memory of Dred Scott was fresh in the minds of many who saw
a direct connection between Taney’s opinion that persons of African
descent could not become citizens and had “no rights which the white man
was bound to respect” and the Court’s decision to strike down Sections 1
and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
In widespread protests against the decision in the Civil Rights Cases,
Taney’s Dred Scott opinion was invoked as a way to emphasize the
retrograde nature of the ruling. African American lawyer Richard T.
Greener denounced it as the “most startling decision of the Supreme
Court” since Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott. 18 Both Greener and Robert
Brown Elliott, an African American from South Carolina who had served
in Congress, asserted that Taney’s opinion was “consistent and logical”
given the status of persons of African descent at the time it was rendered. 19
What troubled both men was that the majority ruling in the Civil Rights
Cases ignored amendments to the Constitution that Elliott characterized
as being “professedly adopted as a protest against the doctrine advanced
by Judge Taney.” 20 For Elliott, the Civil Rights Cases “reaffirmed”
Taney’s opinion and served as vindication of Jefferson Davis’s

congressional debates on the meaning of citizenship and individual rights during and before the Civil
War).
17. The wire service story reporting on the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Civil Rights Cases
appeared in many newspapers. For example, see Unconstitutional, W ATERLOO C OURIER, Oct. 24,
1883.
18. The Civil Rights Decision, B ROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Oct. 21, 1883.
19. Id.
20. Civil Rights, P RATT C OUNTY P RESS (Iuka, KS), Nov. 8, 1883.
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conception of states’ rights. 21 Greener feared that in nullifying a federal
statute that had been passed after extensive deliberations and signed into
law by the president to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had
negated “at least twenty years on the road to progress.” 22 (The estimate
proved optimistic by nearly seventy years.) A Chicago newspaper agreed
with Greener’s assessment and editorialized that the decision represented
nothing less than a return to the “heathenish, feudal decision of Chief
Justice Taney.” 23 Seeking to minimize the damage the Court’s ruling
might do to the Republican Party’s standing with Black voters, a
Republican editor in Emporia, Kansas quoted from Taney’s opinion in
Dred Scott and reminded readers that the Democrat Party had never
questioned Taney’s views on African American citizenship and the
conviction that Black people had no rights that white people were bound
to respect. The editor therefore concluded that the country’s 1.5 million
Black voters could not look to the Democrats “for equality of rights and
privileges with white citizens.” 24
The Republican Party was the party of Lincoln, and its efforts on
behalf of freedom and equality had resulted in steadfast loyalty from
African Americans. But after President Hayes had withdrawn military
support from the final remaining governments under Republican control
in the South in 1877, Republican commitment to racial equality was called
into question. Evidence that Republicans could no longer take African
American voters for granted was seemingly provided just days before the
Supreme Court issued its ruling in the Civil Rights Cases, when Democrat
George Hoadly won a narrow victory in the Ohio gubernatorial election
and attributed this to African American voters. Democrats seized upon the
opportunity the Civil Rights Cases provided to point out that it was a
“Republican Supreme Court” that had declared much of the 1875 Civil
Rights Act unconstitutional. 25 The Pittsburgh Daily Post gleefully noted
how the ruling was “producing consternation in the Republican ranks,”
and Democratic editors found it curious that Robert B. Elliott would “rewrite history” by “paying tribute to the memory of Judge Taney” for
suggesting that his opinion on Black citizenship was consistent with the
circumstances of 1857. 26

21. Id.
22. The Civil Rights Decision, supra note 18.
23. C HICAGO T ELEGRAM, quoted in W EEKLY P UBLIC LEDGER (Memphis, TN), Oct. 23, 1883.
24. Democratic Civil Rights, EMPORIA R EPUBLICAN (Emporia, KS), Nov. 8, 1883.
25. Re-Writing History, EATON DEMOCRAT (Eaton, OH), Nov. 8, 1883.
26. P ITTSBURGH DAILY P OST, Oct. 19, 1883; Rewriting History, P ITTSBURGH DAILY P OST,
Oct. 31, 1883; Re-Writing History, supra note 25.
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Republicans were indeed conflicted by the Court’s ruling, as an
editor in Pennsylvania disapproved of Elliott’s invocation of Taney’s
opinion in Dred Scott and reminded readers that Taney’s “legal
absurdities” sought to accomplish nothing less than the nationalization of
slavery. The majority’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases was therefore
not at all similar to Dred Scott, as the editor assured readers that no rights
were “stricken down” by the Court’s ruling. Instead, the editor naively,
and events would prove vainly, urged Democrats in the southern states to
approve legislation that would “secure those personal rights which the
Court has relegated to the States as exclusively within their jurisdiction.”27
The Chicago Tribune also sought to shore up Republican unity in the
wake of the ruling by criticizing the legal arguments of Frederick
Douglass and other African Americans who had questioned the Court’s
decision in such an “unreasoning and unreasonable spirit.” Troubled by
the prospect that some Black people in Chicago were now openly
questioning whether they would continue to vote Republican, the Tribune
reminded them of “all the benefits the Republican party has conferred
upon their race.” According to the Tribune, access to public
accommodations was a “social right,” not a civil right, and since the
Constitution did not grant Congress power to regulate “social affairs” or
“say what company any man shall keep,” the Court’s decision was
therefore unobjectionable. 28
Robert G. Ingersoll, a noted attorney and orator, took issue with this
distinction between civil rights and social rights when he shared the
speaker’s platform with Frederick Douglass at a mass meeting in
Washington to protest the Civil Rights Cases. Ingersoll asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment created citizens and empowered Congress to
protect “all the rights belonging to a free man.” Contrary to those who
deemed access to public accommodations a matter of social rights,
Ingersoll asserted it was a question of equal rights, for “[r]iding in the
same cars, stopping at the same inns, sitting in the same theatres, no more
involve a social question, or social equality, than speaking the same
language, . . . breathing the same air, . . . defending the same flag, loving
the same country, or living in the same world.” 29 A Civil War veteran,
Ingersoll feared the Court’s ruling would lead to an unraveling of all the
progress that had been made since crushing the rebellion, abolishing
27. Resurrecting Judge Taney, P ITTSBURGH C OMMERCIAL GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1883.
28. The Social Rights Decision, C HICAGO T RIBUNE, Oct. 20, 1883; The Negroes and the
Republican Party, C HICAGO T RIBUNE, Oct. 26, 1883.
29. Proceedings of the Civil Rights Mass-Meeting Held at Lincoln Hall, October 22, 1883, 26,
29, 47–49, 52–53 (1883).
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slavery, and establishing citizenship for formerly enslaved persons. The
decision gave “new life to the serpent of State sovereignty” and “breathed
upon the dying embers of ignorant hate.” Now, the “old issues are again
upon us” and it must be determined whether the federal “arm” would
protect all citizens or “be palsied by the action or non-action of a State.”30
John P. Green, an African American member of the Ohio legislature,
shared Ingersoll’s concerns regarding the wider implications of the
Court’s ruling. Although Green thought that the Civil Rights Act of 1875
was of little “practical utility in the South,” he feared that striking down
the federal law would “establish a precedent for the interfering with and
unsettling the entire legal status of the former slave population.” 31 Just as
Green believed the Court’s ruling in Dred Scott had destroyed the old
Democratic Party, he feared that the ruling in the Civil Rights Cases was
an attempt to foster unity with white Republicans in the South at the
expense of African Americans. Such a move would destroy the party of
Lincoln and undermine all that Republicans had accomplished. 32
A Republican newspaper in Columbus, Ohio editorialized that the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Civil Rights Cases had “aroused the people
of the North to the fact that the work of reconstruction is not yet
complete.” 33 As debate over civil rights enforcement continued, so did
violence in the South, as four Black men were murdered prior to state
elections in Virginia and a white Republican official was assassinated in
Mississippi. Alarmed by these recent events, a convention of African
American men met in Columbus at the end of December and called on the
state legislature to “enact such a law as will secure to every citizen of the
state, regardless of race or color, the full and unchallenged enjoyment of
every civil right accorded to the most favored.” 34 Delegates to the
convention believed the nation was in a crisis where nothing less than
individual rights and the fate of the Union were at risk. The convention’s
president asserted that Southern white terrorists were once again teaching
“the lessons they taught . . . at Fort Pillow.” 35 By invoking the April 1864
massacre of Black soldiers, an explicit connection was made between
Civil War atrocities and efforts to suppress African American citizenship.
The meaning, legacy, and perhaps even the ultimate result of the Civil
War remained undetermined, as the convention drew upon Lincoln’s
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
John P. Green, Civil Rights, C LEVELAND GAZETTE, Oct. 20, 1883.
Id.
Civil Rights, OHIO S TATE JOURNAL (Columbus, OH), Dec. 12, 1883.
Colored Convention, OHIO S TATE JOURNAL (Columbus, OH), Dec. 27, 1883.
Id.
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Gettysburg Address in proclaiming that “the perpetuity and effectiveness
of a government of the people, by the people and for the people” hung in
the balance. 36 Clearly, the task of Reconstruction—adjusting to life after
slavery—was far from complete and reactions to the Civil Rights Cases
complicate the traditional narrative of Reconstruction and suggest that a
“long Reconstruction” extended well beyond 1877.
A Mississippi newspaper editor certainly hoped that the Civil Rights
Cases dealt the final blow to Reconstruction and federal efforts to enforce
“social relations.” 37 According to the editor, the Civil Rights Act of 1875
was “conceived in a spirit of hatred during a period of national madness,”
and he hoped the “good feeling” that had produced the Court’s ruling
would mark a new era of sectional harmony. 38 In a different column, the
Mississippi editor praised the Supreme Court for setting aside partisan
politics in the Civil Rights Cases. He welcomed this “return” to “law and
justice” and likened it to the “purity” that prevailed when Taney was Chief
Justice. 39 The editor’s praise for Taney was part of a larger effort to
rehabilitate Taney. In its October 1883 issue, Century Magazine published
two letters that defended Taney’s reputation as a jurist and friend of
African Americans. The letters offered a vigorous defense by pointing out
that Taney had freed his slaves and harbored no personal animosity
toward African Americans. His opinion on Black rights and citizenship in
Dred Scott was simply restating what the Founders believed and
demonstrated his “respect for precedent and for the letter of the
Constitution.” 40 This evidence suggests that John P. Green had very good
cause for concern that the desire for sectional reconciliation that produced
reunions between Civil War veterans from both sides was tilting so far in
favor of the side that had been defeated on the battlefield that Republicans
would completely abandon their commitment to African American
citizenship. 41
The editor of an African American newspaper in Arkansas
prescribed a seemingly simple remedy for the Civil Rights Cases: “it is
necessary for each state to pass civil rights bills similar to the one made
void by the supreme court.” 42 When asked about the impact of the Civil
Rights Cases, an African American in Cincinnati, Ohio echoed this view

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
T HE W EEKLY DEMOCRAT (Natchez, MS), Oct. 24, 1883.
Id.
NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Oct. 18, 1883.
C ENTURY ILLUSTRATED MAGAZINE, vol. 26, no. 6 (Oct. 1883), at 957–58.
Our Civil Rights Held Inviolate, ARKANSAS MANSION, Nov. 3, 1883.
Id.
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and stated: “It convinced thousands of colored men just as I had been
convinced before—if they wanted their rights secured they must look to
the States in which they lived.” 43 The Democratically-controlled
legislature in Ohio wasted little time in passing a civil rights law that
sought to protect equal access to public accommodations. 44 Several
northern states soon followed Ohio’s lead by enacting statutes modeled
after the 1875 Civil Rights Act. The story of Ohio’s 1884 Civil Rights
Act, as well as the other public accommodations laws approved in the
wake of the Civil Rights Cases, has largely been ignored in the historical
and legal literature, as scholars have tended to dismiss the significance of
these northern civil rights statutes from the 1880s. As significant as these
laws were, however, even more important was the failure of even a single
former-Confederate state to enact such a statute.
B
Given the significance of the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights
Cases, the depth and breadth of reactions it provoked, the various political
and legal maneuverings it prompted, and the extent to which all of this
contributed to debates over equal rights and citizenship, the long
Reconstruction, and legacy of the Civil War, it is remarkable how little
attention historians have devoted to the subject. The standard synthesis on
the Reconstruction Era, Eric Foner’s Reconstruction: America’s
Unfinished Revolution (1988) mentions the Civil Rights Cases in passing
and suggests that Harlan’s dissent was a “lonely voice.” 45 Michael
Fitzgerald’s more recent Splendid Failure: Postwar Reconstruction in the
American South (2007) 46 does not discuss the Civil Rights Cases, while
Allen Guelzo’s Reconstruction: A Concise History (2018) only briefly
discusses the ruling. 47 In Inherently Unequal: The Betrayal of Equal
Rights by the Supreme Court, 1865-1903 (2011), Lawrence Goldstone
recognizes the significance of the Civil Rights Cases by devoting a chapter
to the subject and condemning Bradley’s opinion as erroneous. 48 In his
recently published book, The Second Founding: How the Civil War and
43. Well! Well! More Developments as to Republican Election Methods, C INCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Apr. 23, 1884.
44. T HE R EVISED LAWS OF OHIO 483-84 (O.W. Aldrich ed., 2d ed. 1884).
45. ERIC F ONER, R ECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’ S UNFINISHED R EVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at
587 (1988).
46. MICHAEL F ITZGERALD, S PLENDID F AILURE: P OSTWAR R ECONSTRUCTION IN THE
AMERICAN S OUTH (2007).
47. ALLEN C. GUELZO, R ECONSTRUCTION: A C ONCISE HISTORY 118, 128 (2018).
48. LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: T HE B ETRAYAL OF EQUAL R IGHTS BY
THE S UPREME C OURT, 1865-1903, at 118-29 (2011).
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Reconstruction Remade the Constitution (2019), Foner offers a much
more extensive analysis of the Civil Rights Cases and the reaction to the
Court’s decision than he did in his previous work on Reconstruction. 49
Foner’s reassessment of the significance of the Civil Rights Cases along
with Pamela Brandwein’s Rethinking the Judicial Settlement of
Reconstruction (2011), 50 and Friedland and Gerber’s Welcoming Ruin
(2019), 51 an exhaustive history of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, suggest that scholars are beginning to re-examine the significance
of both the federal law and the Court’s decision to invalidate it.
Despite these recent contributions, it is evident that the Civil Rights
Cases and the responses to the Court’s decision merit a thorough
consideration, for it was more than mere hyperbole when the ruling was
compared to Dred Scott. While not the sequel that Lincoln and others
warned of prior to the Civil War, the Civil Rights Cases had a more
significant and lasting impact on African American citizenship and civil
rights. Just five years after Dred Scott, Lincoln’s attorney general issued
an opinion that disputed Taney’s view of African American citizenship,
and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment followed in 1868. In
declaring Sections 1 and 2 of Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court relieved the federal government of the responsibility
for enforcing civil rights and left the matter up to the states. The ruling in
the Civil Rights Cases has not been overturned, and it would be eight
decades before Congress would enact new civil rights legislation.
Contrary to the hopes of many, the Court’s ruling provided further proof
that the revolution was moving backward, and as Robert Brown Elliott
feared, “Time has, indeed, brought its revenge.” 52
IV.
Other symposia have been profitably devoted to consideration of the
concept of the constitutional anti-canon, 53 so this essay is no place to seek
to contribute to those rich discussions. But while the precise contours of
the concept of an anti-canon as well as the cases properly belonging in it
49. ERIC F ONER, T HE S ECOND F OUNDING: HOW THE C IVIL W AR AND R ECONSTRUCTION
R EMADE THE C ONSTITUTION 151–57 (2019).
50. P AMELA B RANDWEIN, R ETHINKING THE JUDICIAL S ETTLEMENT OF R ECONSTRUCTION
(2011).
51. ALAN F RIEDLANDER & R ICHARD ALAN GERBER, W ELCOMING R UIN: T HE C IVIL R IGHTS
ACT OF 1875 (2019).
52. Civil Rights, P RATT C OUNTY P RESS (Iuka, KS), Nov. 8, 1883.
53. See, e.g., Symposium: Supreme Mistakes, 39 P EPP . L. R EV. 1 (2011). But see generally
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. R EV. 379 (2011) (sounding a cautionary note about the
“ incomplete theorization” of the elements of anti-canonical status).
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remain contested, 54 a few elements stand out as especially relevant to the
concept’s purpose and, accordingly, its scope. The main function of the
very notion is educational in the broadest possible sense. Anti-canon
cases teach law students, legal scholars and other interested writers, and
jurists present and future about virtuous use of the extraordinary power of
judicial review by inviting careful study of its catastrophes. 55 Thus, to
qualify for anti-canonical status a case must be universally, or almost
universally, recognized as “wrong,” meaning that the Court’s ruling did
not comport with the Constitution rightly understood. 56 But more than
error, even error so widely acknowledged, is required before a case
belongs in the anti-canon. The case should also have worked enormous
and enduring harm to the legal order and the society it serves. 57 The case
should also have the capacity to teach important lessons about judicial
virtue by highlighting an especially clear example of its telling absence. 58
By these measures, the Civil Rights Cases are clearly not currently
anti-canonical. Most importantly, the ruling is not widely recognized,
either in the legal academy or in the legal profession, as erroneous. To
the contrary, it not only remains “good law” (both in the technical sense
that it has never been expressly overruled and also in the more general
sense that it has not been overtaken or denigrated by intervening cases),
but it continues to generate legal progeny. As recently as the Rehnquist
Court’s invalidation of the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act, 59 the Civil Rights Cases have been reaffirmed and
extended. 60 From a doctrinal standpoint, the ruling is not merely alive
but, all too sadly, well.
Development of the arguments, not to mention a strategy, for
changing the ruling’s formal legal status is obviously beyond the scope of
this brief essay. 61 The short challenge to the majority’s reasoning, or more
accurately its dismissive silence, set out above will have to suffice for
present purposes. But assuming that careful reconsideration of the
constitutional case undergirding the 1875 Act will in time produce an
54. See Greene, supra note 53, at 379.
55. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on
“The Banjo Serenader” and “The Lying Crowd of Jews,” 20 C ARDOZO L. R EV. 1513, 1553 (1999).
56. See id.
57. To illustrate, Dred Scott anchors the anti-canon for many reasons, but high among them
must be its contribution to bringing about the tragedy of the American Civil War. See Daniel A.
Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 P EPP . L. R EV. 13, 38 (2011).
58. See, e.g., id. at 38 (describing Dred Scott “ as an exercise in judicial overreaching,
intellectual dishonesty, and disastrous statesmanship”).
59. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
60. Id. at 622.
61. We do aspire, however, to that end, among others related to it, in future efforts.
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academic and judicial repudiation of the Civil Rights Cases, the remainder
of this essay sketches the additional considerations that would place the
case in the anti-canon. In addition to being wrongly decided, the decision
has worked the kind of profound harm that sets it apart from mere error.
The ruling also illustrates the kind of profound abuse 62 of judicial
authority that has much to teach to those who would understand or
practice sound exercise of that power.
It is tempting to assume that the extent of the harms traceable to the
Civil Rights Cases is obvious. The decision strangled in the cradle a
national civil rights guarantee, the breadth of which would not be achieved
again for nearly a century—a century of oppression so ubiquitous and
indefensible as to be recognized by the nation’s political leadership at the
time as a serious liability from a foreign affairs perspective. The
historiographical apology for the ruling, 63 however, which asserts that it
was at most insult added onto injury already and independently inflicted,
requires a response.
It may be true that the political will to enforce the law had lapsed in
the wake of the notorious Compromise of 1877, 64 though that conclusion
may itself be overstated and overly simplistic. 65 But, in any event, this
effort to explain away the ruling’s significance, even if grounded in some
truth, ignores two crucial facts, first about the 1875 Act specifically and
second about statutes more generally.
First, though some have disparaged the law’s enforcement
provisions, 66 the 1875 Act authorized robust penalties both civil and
criminal, 67 even going so far as to impose liability on federal prosecutors

62. Some of the recognized anti-canon cases might be better characterized as instances o f
neglect than abuse of this authority. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
63. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
64. Accord F ONER, supra note 45, at 587.
65. Paul Finkelman, The Hidden History of Northern Civil Rights Law and the Villainous
Supreme Court, 1875-1915, 79 U. P ITT. L. R EV. 357, 503 (2018) (observing that “ the northern
response to the Court’s rejection of racial fairness in the Civil Rights Cases was to adopt state laws to
accomplish what the Court would not let Congress accomplish” and concluding that “ [t]hese laws
demonstrate that northern white public opinion was not in concert with the Supreme Court.”).
66. See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, T HE W ARS OF R ECONSTRUCTION: T HE B RIEF, VIOLENT
HISTORY OF AMERICA’ S MOST P ROGRESSIVE ERA (2014) (arguing in chapter 8 that “ the
complications and cost involved with filing suit” contributed to rendering the 1875 Act a nullity even
before it was stuck down by the Supreme Court).
67. The Act provided an election of remedies between, on the one hand, a civil suit in federal
court for a monetary penalty and, on the other hand, criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor. In
either case, the authorized sanctions were significant. “ [A]ny person who” violated the first section’s
prohibition of discrimination, or aided or incited such a violation, could be required, “ for every such
offense, [to] forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be
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for willful failure to enforce the Act. 68 So political will to enforce, if
indeed flagging, might well have been spurred or supplanted by members
of the bar acting as private attorneys general. And, of course, for every
time the statute was executed via judicial order at the end of lengthy
process, on innumerable additional occasions the statute’s command
would be effectuated via such less rancorous means as a demand letter or
coldly calculated self-enforcement by corporate firms interested only in
their bottom line. 69 Second, the existence of a valid law on the books
would have squarely placed on those opposed to the Act’s protections the
burden of obtaining its repeal. Judicial invalidation of the law, however,
meant that instead those seeking equal access to public accommodations
bore the gargantuan burden of enacting new civil rights legislation. That
heroic feat took just short of a century. Civil rights legislation was
narrowly thwarted countless times in the interim solely by

recovered in an action of debt, with full costs.” Alternatively, a criminal conviction for violating the
Act would entail the imposition of a fine “ not less than five hundred nor more than one
thousand dollars” or imprisonment “ not less than thirty days nor more than one year.” Civil Rights
Act of 1875, ch. 114, § 2, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (emphasis added). To provide perspective concerning the
substantiality of the monetary penalties, in 1875 the annual salary of the President of the United States
was $50,000 (having been doubled in 1873). Cf. Finkelman, supra note 65, at 400 (observing that
“ [u]nder an “ inflation” measure, $100 in 1887 was equal to the buying power of almost two thousand
dollars today” and “ [c]ompared to wages earned, $100 in 1887 might be worth as much as $10,000
today”).
68. Perhaps reflecting an anticipated reticence to enforce the Act, the Act’s third section
“ specially authorized and required” those U.S. “ district attorneys, marshals, and deputy marshals . . .
, and commissioners appointed by the [U.S.] circuit and territorial courts, with powers of arresting
and imprisoning or bailing offenders against [U.S.] laws” to bring legal “ proceedings against every
person who shall violate the provisions of this act, and cause him to be arrested and imprisoned or
bailed, as the case may be, for trial.” Lest the import of that language be disregarded or evaded, the
Act further ordered that “ such district attorneys shall cause such proceedings to be prosecuted to their
termination as in other cases” and provided that “ any district attorney who shall willfully fail to
institute and prosecute the proceedings herein required, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay
the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered by an action of debt
with full costs, and shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be fined not
less than one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars. . . .” Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114,
§ 3, 18 Stat. 335, 336 (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., A Civil Rights Case Avoided by a Compromise, C LEVELAND GAZETTE, July 4,
1885, at 4 (recounting an episode in which a restaurant paid one Mr. Stevens, who had been refus ed
service, “ a handsome sum” to forgo filing suit under an Ohio civil-rights statute modelled on the 1875
federal statute).
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antimajoritarian procedural hurdles, 70 including notorious abuse of the
Senate’s filibuster. 71
However the direct effects of nine decades of the Act’s enforcement
might have been weighed, to that would need to be added the inestimable
ripple effect on the culture more generally that each episode of
enforcement would have launched. Each invocation of the law would
have subtly but no less substantially inculcated the greater society’s most
revered commitment to equal citizenship. After its invalidation, this
salutary instruction was replaced by the opposite message reinforced by
Jim Crow’s endless series of causal and universal slights. 72 Little
reflection would seem necessary to support the conclusion that it would
be hard to overstate how disastrous were the consequences of the Civil
Rights Cases. Without in any way minimalizing the injuries worked by
other anti-canonical rulings, a thorough accounting of the harms caused
by the Civil Rights Cases suggests that the decision easily belongs in such
notorious company as Dred Scott, 73 Plessy, 74 Locher, 75 and Korematsu. 76
The decision also deeply distorted the course of constitutional law.
And this distortion underscores perhaps the most important aspect of the
hubris that bred it—namely, a judicial failure to accord Congress its
proper role in giving flesh to the Fourteenth Amendment’s bare bones. As
Harlan’s dissent documented, throughout the antebellum decades, the
Court had accorded wide latitude to congressional efforts to employ both
expressly enumerated and even justly implied powers to protect slavery.
“That doctrine,” Harlan powerfully proclaimed, “ought not now to be
abandoned, when the inquiry is not as to an implied power to protect the
master’s rights, but what may congress do, under powers expressly
70. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment,
90 B.U. L. R EV. 255, 301 (2010) (“ From 1937 to 1950, a flood of civil rights legislation was
introduced in Congress. Segregationists in Congress blocked or watered down that legislation until
1964, when Congress enacted the first major civil rights legislation enacted since Reconstruction.”).
Segregationists prevailed in the pre-1964 contests not because they enjoyed electoral majorities but
rather through the effective employment of various anti-majoritarian political and legislative tools.
See Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts, and 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57
R UTGERS L. R EV. 945, 959 (2005).
71. See Zietlow, To Secure These Rights, supra note 70, at 959.
72. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO C IVIL R IGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE S TRUGGLE FOR R ACIAL EQUALITY 94 (2004) (discussing the deep and enduring injury
inflicted when African Americans took their “ medicine of insult, discourtesy and prejudice sitting
down and saying nothing, thereby losing their self-respect”) .
73. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
74. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
75. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Jamal Greene identifies these four as
the canonical cases of the existing constitutional anti-canon. See Greene, supra note 53, at 387.
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granted, for the protection of freedom, and the rights necessarily inhering
in a state of freedom.” 77 In support of that claim Harlan had on his side
not only rhetoric and reason but also constitutional text 78 and history. 79
Nevertheless, one legacy of his defeat in 1883 is that to the present the
Court meets with suspicion congressional efforts to make meaningful the
promises of the Reconstruction Amendments. 80 This judicial usurpation
is another reason the Civil Rights Cases must be recognized as a wrong
turn too important to remain uncorrected.
V. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of interposition posits a role for a State, acting as an
independent sovereign, to intercede between the federal government and
citizens within the State to shield the latter from the former by retarding
if not negating federal policy. 81 At the risk of comical understatement,
that doctrine is itself controversial. 82 Lacking any pretense to the
legitimacy and representativeness enjoyed by a State’s elected officials,
the Supreme Court, in the Civil Rights Cases, acting over Harlan’s
thorough and well-reasoned dissent, nevertheless interposed itself
between the people of all the States and the policy their federal elected
representatives had chosen as a means of progressing nearer the
77. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 38 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. U.S. C ONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
79. See A. Christopher Bryant, The Pursuit of Perfection: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments, 47 HOUS. L. R EV. 579, 598-601 (2010) (discussing historical context
supporting congressional primacy in enforcement of the Reconstruction and citing related
scholarship).
80. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 as applied to state local governments on the ground that the statute
so applied exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (invalidating the civil-remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 on the ground that the statute exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers, including
the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013)
(invalidating the coverage formula triggering application of the Voting Rights Act’s preclearan ce
requirement on the ground that as crafted it could not be sustained as valid exercise of Congress’s
power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments).
81. For a discussion of the historical roots of the notion of state “ interposition,” see Bradley D.
Hays, A Place for Interposition? What John Taylor of Caroline and the Embargo Crisis Have to Offer
Regarding Resistance to the Bush Constitution, 67 MD. L. R EV. 200, 207 (2007).
82. The notion has more than a whiff of “ massive resistance” and Little Rock. As Michael
Paulsen has noted, “ ‘Interposition’ and ‘Nullification’ are dirty words these days, because they have
been invoked on the wrong sides of the great constitutional crises of our nation’s history—southern
secessionists resisting the Union and southern segregationists resisting Brown v. Board of Education.”
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation:
Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-third Century, 59 ALB. L. R EV. 671, 686 (1995). He
continued: “ But it is not too hard to imagine the shoe being on the other foot.” Id.
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achievement of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of birthright
citizenship free from the taint of race. Neither the Court, nor the legal
academy, nor the nation has yet to fully comprehend, let alone correct,
this grave error.

